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Abstract
The paper is the second part of a trilogy in which we extend the
analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers be-
yond duopoly to triopoly. In the first part of the trilogy we provided
some general results, highlighting features of a duopolistic mixed strat-
egy equilibrium that generalize to triopoly and provided a first parti-
tion concerning the pure strategy equilibrium regions and the mixed
strategies equilibrium region and then the partition of this region in a
part in which the payoffs of the two smallest firm are proportional to
their capacities and another in which the smallest firm obtains a payoff
proportinally higher than that of the middle sized firm. In this paper
we provide a complete characterization of the set of mixed strategy
equilibria in the part in which the payoffs of the two smallest firms are
proportional to their capacities. This part is partitioned according to
equilibrium features and in each part it is determined whether equilib-
ria are uniquely determined or not and in the latter case it is proved
that the equilibria constitute a continuum. Further we determine the
circustances in which supports of an equilibrium strategy may be dis-
connected and show how gaps are then determined. We also prove that
the union of supports is indeed connected, a property which cannot be
extended to the case in which the smallest firm obtains a payoff pro-
portinally higher than that of the middle sized firm. The third part of
the trilogy will be devoted to a complete characterization of the mixed
strategy equilibria when the smallest firm obtains a payoff proporti-
nally higher than that of the middle sized firm. This will allow also to
determine the payoff of the smallest firm.
1
1 Introduction
This paper is the second part of a trilogy concerning price competition
among capacity-constrained sellers, which has attracted considerable inter-
est since Levitan and Shubik’s [16] modern reappraisal of Bertrand and
Edgeworth. In the first part of the trilogy ([10]) we provided the general
introduction with a survey of the literature. Here it is sufficient to remark
that in the current state of the art, a complete characterization of equilibria
of the price game exists only for the duopoly [15] and for special cases when
the number of firms is higher than 2.1
In the first part of the trilogy ([10]) we have shown that several properties
of a duopolistic mixed strategy equilibrium prove to generalize to triopoly:
the values of the minimum and the maximum of the support of the equi-
librium strategy for any firm with the highest capacity (equal to pm and
pM , respectively, as defined here in Section 2); the equilibrium payoff of any
firm with the second highest capacity. On the other hand, in a duopoly the
supports of the equilibrium strategies completely overlap, which need not be
the case in a triopoly.2 In a duopoly the region of the capacity space where
no pure strategy equilibrium exists can be partitioned in two subsets: one in
which both firms get the same payoff per unit of capacity and one in which
the smaller firm gets a higher payoff per unit of capacity. The latter subset
is characterized by the fact that the capacity of the larger firm is higher than
total demand at pm. In the triopoly, on the contrary, as we have shown in
[10], there are several relevant subsets of the region where no pure strategy
equilibrium exists.
1. In one subset, as in the duopoly, the capacity of the largest firm is
larger than or equal to demand at pm. In this subset the other firms
get the same payoff per unit of capacity, higher than that of the largest
firm.
2. In another subset the sum of the capacities of the two largest firm is
1Vives [20] characterized the (symmetric) mixed strategy equilibrium for the case of
equal capacities among all firms. In a previous paper we [9] generalized Vives result to the
case in which the capacities of the largest and smallest firm are sufficiently close. Within
an analysis concerning horizontal merging of firms Davidson and Deneckere [4] provided
the complete analysis (apart from the fact that attention is restricted to equilibria in
which strategies of equally-sized firms are symmetrical) of a Bertrand-Edgeworth game
with linear demand, equally-sized small firms and one large firm with a capacity that is a
multiple of the small firm’s capacity.
2That minima of the supports of the equilibfium strategies may differ has also been
recognized in [13] and [14].
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smaller than or equal to demand at pm. In this subset all firms get
the same payoff per unit of capacity.
3. In another subset both the smallest firms have the same size and the
capacity of the largest firm is smaller than demand at pm. In this
subset all firms get the same payoff per unit of capacity too.
4. The complement of the previous three subsets can be partitioned in
two parts. In one part the smallest firm gets a higher payoff per unit
of capacity than the others, that in turn get the same payoff per unit
of capacity, a fact also discovered by [14]. Yet we determined the
interval where the payoff of the smallest firm must be and provided
examples for the exact determination of that payoff (a general rule
for determining that payoff will be provided in the third paper of the
trilogy). In the other part all firms get the same payoff per unit of
capacity and the supports of the largest and the smallest firms have a
lower bound equal to the lower bound of the overall price distribution,
whereas the middle sized firm set prices only at higher levels.
In this paper we will add the following results.
• In the subset mentioned in 1 above, differently from the analogous
subset in the duopoly, the equilibrium strategies of the smallest firms
are constrained but not uniquely determined (there is a continuum of
equilibria).
• There are other subsets (parts of the subsets mentioned in 2 and 3
above) in which the equilibrium strategies of the two smallest firms
are similarly constrained and not uniquely determined, but not in the
whole union of the supports of equilibrium strategies. In these subsets
the largest firm can meet total demand at prices close to pM . An
example of this case was also provided in [10], here we provide the
complete analysis.
• In some subsets (parts of the subsets mentioned in 2 and 3 above) the
equilibrium support of strategies of some firm is necessarily discon-
nected and in some other subsets it may be disconnected or not (since
a continuum of equilibria exists). In any case the union of supports is
connected. We will also determine the gaps.3
3Osborne and Pitchik [18] clarified that in duopoly, under the set of assumptions on
demand adopted here, supports of equilibrium strategies are connected, otherwise supports
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• The subset mentioned in 4 above in which all firms get the same payoff
per unit of capacity generally involves a continuum of equilibria (but
if a special condition holds, the equilibrium is unique).
• No atom in the range [pm, pM ) may exist in any of the subsets inves-
tigated in this paper (as shown by an example in [10] this is not so in
subsets investigated in the third paper of the trilogy).
One of the main aim of this paper is methodological. Indeed we will
introduce a number of functions and procedures that will also be used in
part three of the trilogy, where we will determine not only the complete
characterization of the mixed strategy equilibria in the part in which the
smallest firm obtains a payoff proportionally higher than that of the middle
sized firm, but also the payoff of this firm, whereas in the first part of the
trilogy we determined only a range in which this payoff must stay. However,
as also the examples provided in [10] has shown, the payoff of the smallest
firm cannot be determined in this subregion of the region in which a pure
strategy equilibrium cannot exist without determining also the equilibrium
strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains definitions and the
basic assumptions of the model along with a summary of the propositions
proved in [10]. For the sake of simplicity we will refer only to propositions
used in this paper, but we will follow the original numeration. Sections 3 and
4 introduce two sets of functions which will be used as tools. Section 5 builds
the profiles of equilibrium strategies and complete the partition of the region
of the capacity space where no pure strategy equilibrium exists and the
payoffs of the two smallest firm are proportional to their capacities; in this
section we prove that either the equilibrium is unique or there is a continuum
of equilibria, and we identify the two complementary subsets of the region
investigated where the former and latter hold true, respectively. We also
prove that gaps do not overlap and that atoms in equilibrium strategies are
absent (apart from the maximum of the support of the largest firm, which
it charges with positive probability when its capacity is strictly higher than
for any other firm). Section 6 provides some examples. Section 7 briefly
concludes.
need not be connected. Quite differently, we will prove that under triopoly the supports
need not be connected (although their union is) even under concavity of the demand
function.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we mention all the assumptions, the definitions, and the
results mentioned in [10] that are relevant for this paper too. An exception
is an assumption that we introduce here and we did not need to introduce
in [10].
Assumption 1. There are 3 firms producing a homogeneous good at
the same constant unit cost (normalized to zero), up to capacity.
Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of firms and N−i = N −{i}. Without loss of
generality, we consider the subset of the capacity space (K1,K2,K3) where
K1 > K2 > K3 > 0 (1)
and we define K = K1 +K2 +K3.
Assumption 2. The market demand function is given by D(p) (demand
as a function of price p) and P (x) (price as a function of quantity x). The
function D(p) is strictly positive on some bounded interval [0, p∗), on which
it is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and such that pD(p) is
strictly concave; it is continuous for p > 0 and equals 0 for p > p∗; X =
D(0) < ∞. P (x) = D−1(x) on the bounded interval (0, X); the function
P (x) is continuous for x > 0 and equals 0 for x > X; p∗ = P (0) <∞.
Assumption 3. It is assumed throughout that any rationing is accord-
ing to the efficient rule.
In some propositions we will use a stronger assumption on demand,
namely
Assumption 2*. Assumption 2 holds and D′′(p) 6 0.
Let pc be the competitive price, that is
pc = P (K). (2)
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. (i) (p1, p2, p3) = (p
c, pc, pc)
is an equilibrium if and only if either
K −K1 > X, if X 6 K, (3)
or
K1 6 −pc
[
D′(p)
]
p=pc
= − P (K)
P ′(K)
, if X > K. (4)
In the former case the set of equilibria includes any strategy profile such
that Ω(0) 6= ∅ and ∑s∈Ω(0)−{j}Ks > X for each j ∈ Ω(0). In the latter,
(pc, pc, pc) is the unique equilibrium.
(ii) No pure strategy equilibrium exists if neither (3) nor (4) holds.
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Proof See [10].
On the basis of Proposition 1 the region of the capacity space where no
pure strategy equilibrium exists is the region where
K1 > max
{
K −X,− P (K)
P ′(K)
}
(5)
and inequalities (1) hold. In this region a strategy by firm i is denoted
by σi : (0,∞) → [0, 1], where σi(p) = Prσi(pi < p) is the probability
of firm i charging less than p under strategy σi. Of course, any function
σi(p) is non-decreasing and everywhere continuous except at p
◦ such that
Prσi(pi = p
◦) > 0, where it is left-continuous (limp→p◦− σi(p) = σi(p◦)),
but not continuous. An equilibrium is denoted by φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3), where
φi(p) = Prφi(pi < p). We denote by Πi(σi, σ−i) firm i’s payoff (expected
profit) at strategy profile (σi, σ−i). Obviously Πi(φ) = Πi(φi, φ−i) denotes
firm i’s expected profit at the equilibrium strategy profile φ and Πi(p, φ−i)
denotes firm i’s expected profit when it charges p with certainty and the
rivals are playing their equilibrium profile of strategies φ−i. Of course,
Πi(φi, φ−i) > Πi(σi, φ−i) for each i and and each σi. When no doubt can
arise, and for the sake of brevity, we write Π∗i rather than Πi(φi, φ−i) and
Πi(p) rather than Πi(p, φ−i). Further, we denote by Si(φi) the support of
φi and by p
(i)
M (φi) and p
(i)
m (φi) the maximum and minimum of Si(φi), re-
spectively. More specifically, we say that p ∈ Si(φi) when φi(·) is increasing
at p, that is, when there is δ > 0 such that φi(p + h) > φi(p − h) for any
0 < h < δ, whereas p /∈ Si(φi) if φi(p + h) = φi(p − h) for some h > 0.
Obviously, Π∗i = Πi(p) almost everywhere in Si(φi). Once again, when no
doubt can arise and for the sake of brevity, we write Si, p
(i)
M , and p
(i)
m rather
than Si(φi), p
(i)
M (φi), and p
(i)
m (φi), respectively. If Si is not connected, i.e. if
φi(p) is constant in an open interval (p˜, ˜˜p) whose endpoints are in Si (p˜ ∈ Si
and ˜˜p ∈ Si), then the interval (p˜, ˜˜p) will be referred to as a gap in Si. In
order to shorten notation, we denote limp→h+ Πi(p) and limp→h−Πi(p) as
Πi(h+) and Πi(h−), respectively, and limp→h+ φi(p) as φi(h+).
So long as firm i’s rivals’ equilibrium strategies φ−i(p) are continuous in
p, Πi(p) = Zi(p;φ−i(p)), where
Zi(p;ϕ−i) := p
∑
ψ∈P(N−i)
qi,ψ(p)
∏
r∈ψ
ϕr
∏
s∈N−i−ψ
(1− ϕs), (6)
ϕ’s are taken as independent variables (with the obvious constraints that
ϕj ∈ [0, 1], each j), P(N−i) = {ψ} is the power set of N−i, and qi,ψ(p) =
6
max{0,min{D(p)−∑r∈ψKr,Ki}} is firm i’s output when it charges p, any
firm r ∈ ψ charges less than p and any firm s ∈ N−i−ψ charges more than p.4
If instead Prφj (pj = p
◦) > 0 for some j 6= i, then Zi(p◦;φ−i(p◦)) > Πi(p◦) >
limp→p◦+ Zi(p;φ−i(p)).5 Note that since
∑
ψ∈P(N−i)
∏
r∈ψ ϕr
∏
s∈N−i−ψ(1−
ϕs) = 1, if ϕi ∈ [0, 1], then the RHS of (6) is an average of the functions
pqi,ψ(p)’s. As a consequence pqi,N−i(p) 6 Zi(p;φ−i) 6 pqi,∅(p).
Lemma 1
(ii) Z1(p;ϕ2, ϕ3) is concave and increasing in p throughout [pm, pM ].
(iii) Zi(p;ϕ−i) (each i 6= 1) is concave in p over any range enclosed in
(pm, pM ) in which it is differentiable; local convexity only arises at P (K1 +
Kr) ∈ (pm, pM ) (r 6= 1, i), if ϕ1ϕr > 0, and at P (K1) ∈ (pm, pM ), if ϕ1(1−
ϕr) > 0 (r 6= 1, i).
(v) Zi(p;ϕ−i) is continuous and differentiable in ϕj and ∂Zi/∂ϕj ≤ 0,
each i and j 6= i. More precisely: if p ∈ (pm, P (K1)), then ∂Zi/∂ϕj < 0,
each i and j 6= i; if p ≥ P (K1), then ∂Z1/∂ϕj < 0, ∂Zi/∂ϕ1 < 0, and
∂Zi/∂ϕj = 0 (each i 6= 1 and j 6= 1, i).
Proof See [10].
Let us also define
pM = arg max
p
pq1,N−1(p); (7)
pm = min
{
p : pq1,∅(p) = max
p
pq1,N−1(p)
}
. (8)
The definitions of pM and pm also make it possible to characterize the
region where inequalities (5) and (1) hold by substituting inequality (5) with
inequality
P (K) < pm. (5
′)
Note that in the region where inequalities (5) and (1) hold we have:
pM = arg max
p
p
D(p)−∑
j 6=1
Kj
 (9)
pm = max{p̂, ̂̂p}, (10)
4Note that
∏
r∈ψ ϕr is the empty product, hence equal to 1, when ψ = ∅; and it is
similarly
∏
s∈N−i−ψ(1− ϕs) = 1 when ψ = N−i.
5The exact value of Πi(p
◦) when Prφj (pj = p
◦) > 0 for some j 6= i depends on the
specific assumption made on how the residual demand is shared among firms charging the
same price
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where
p̂ =
maxp p[D(p)−
∑
j 6=1Kj ]
K1
(11)
̂̂p = min
p : pD(p) = maxp p
D(p)−∑
j 6=1
Kj
 . (12)
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (5′) hold. In
any equilibrium φj(pM ) = 1 for any j such that Kj < K1; p
(i)
M = pM for
some i such that Ki = K1, and
Π∗i = maxp p
D(p)−∑
j 6=1
Kj
 (13)
for any i such that Ki = K1.
Proof See [10].
Let M = {i ∈ N : p(i)M = pM} and L = {i ∈ N : p(i)m = pm}.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (5′) hold. In
any equilibrium (φ1, φ2, φ3):
(iv) If (p◦, p◦◦) ⊂ Si, then (p◦, p◦◦) ⊂ ∪j 6=iSj;
(vii) For any i 6= 1 such that p(i)M > P (K1), Π∗i = pmKi.
Proof See [10]; Proposition 4(iv)&(vii).
We introduce the following partition of the region defined by inequalities
(5) and (1).
A = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3, D(p̂) 6 K1}.
B = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K > D(p̂) > K1 +K2}.
C1 = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 +K2 > D(p̂) > K1 +K3}.
C2 = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 +K3 > D(p̂), D(pM ) > K1}
C3 = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 + K3 > D(p̂), D(pM ) < K1 <
D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
}
D = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 + K3 > D(p̂), D(pM ) <
D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
6 K1 < D(p̂)}6
E = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 = K3,K1 < D(p̂)}.
Next we introduce and study a number of functions to be used later.
6If K1 +K3 > D(p̂), then D(pM ) < D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
since the latter inequality is equivalent
to pM (K1 −K3) > p̂K1 = pM (D(pM )−K2 −K3).
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Proposition 4 Let K1 + Kj > D(pm) > K1 (some j 6= 1). (i) Denote
by φ?1j(p) =
(p−pm)Kj
p[K1+Kj−D(p)] and φ
?
j (p) =
(p−pm)K1
p[K1+Kj−D(p)] the solutions of equa-
tions pmKj = Zj(p;ϕ1, 0) and pmK1 = Z1(p;ϕj , 0), respectively, over the
range {pm,min{P (K1), pM}). Then φ?1j(p) and φ?j (p) are increasing and
lower than 1 over the range [pm,min{p˜(j)M , P (K1)}], where p˜(j)M is the unique
solution in [pm, pM ] of the equation K1pm = [D(p)−Kj ]p.
(ii) Denote by φ??1j (p) and φ
??
j (p) the solutions of equations pmKj =
Zj(p;ϕ1, 1) and pmK1 = Z1(p;ϕj , 1), respectively. Then:
(ii.a) Over the range [pm,min{P (K1 + K3), pM}], φ??12(p) = (p−pm)K2p[K−D(p)]
and φ??2 (p) =
K1
K2
φ??1 (p), which are both increasing.
(ii.b) Over the range [pm,min{P (K1 + K3), pM}], φ??13(p) = p−pmp and
φ??3 (p) =
p[D(p)−K2]−K1pm
K3p
, which are both increasing.
(ii.c) Over the range [max{P (K1 + K3), pm}, pM ], φ??1j (p) = p−pmp and
φ??j (p) =
p[D(p)−Ki]−K1pm
Kjp
, (i 6= 1, j) which are both increasing.
Proof See [10]; Proposition 7.
Next we state the parts of the main theorem proved in [10] that are
relevant for the results presented here.
Theorem 1.7 Let the region defined by inequalities (5) and (1) be par-
titioned as above. (a) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ A, then in any equilibrium pm = ̂̂p
and Π∗1 = pmD(pm); Π∗j = pmKj (each j 6= 1).
(b) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B, then in any equilibrium pm = p̂, Π∗i = pmKi
for all i, L = {1, 2, 3}.
(d) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ D, then in any equilibrium pm = p̂, Π∗i = pmKi
for all i, L = {1, 3} and p(2)m > P (K1).
(e) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ E, then in any equilibrium pm = p̂ and Π∗i = pmKi
for all i.
Proof See [10]; Theorem 1(a)-(b)&(d)-(e).
7Hirata discovered to a large extent that L = {1, 2, 3} in sets A ∪B ∪ E ([14], Claims
3 and 6), but he was not concerned with Prφi(pi = pm) = 0. He recognized the fact
that p
(3)
m > pm and Π
∗
3 > pmK3 in what is here called C1, C2, and C3 ([14], Claims 4
and 5), but he was not concerned with how p
(3)
m and Π
∗
3 are then determined. Hirata also
recognized that p
(2)
m > pm and Π
∗
3 = pmK3 in our set D ([14], Claim 5),
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3 Functions φ◦1(p), φ
◦
2(p), and φ
◦
3(p))
In this paper we will build the profiles of equilibrium strategies when Π∗3 =
pmK3. More precisely, Theorem 2 below provides profiles of equilibrium
strategies for capacity configurations in the set A∪B∪D∪E and Theorem 3
subsequently proves that no other equilibrium exists. In order to accomplish
the first task we define a number of functions, as done in Proposition 4. This
will be done in this section and in the next one.
Consider the system of equations in ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 at any p ∈ [pm, pM ]
Π∗i = Zi(p;ϕ−i), i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (14)
and denote (φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)) a solution of its when Π∗1 = pM [D(pM ) −
K2 −K3], Π∗2 = pmK2, Π∗3 = pmK3, and 0 6 φ◦1(p) 6 1.
Clearly, if p ∈ S1∩S2∩S3, then (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) = (φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)).
But in general (φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)) is not a profile of strategies since φ◦1(p),
φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p) do not need to be non-decreasing and codomains of φ◦2(p) and
φ◦3(p) do not need to be enclosed in [0, 1]. Next proposition will explore the
properties of functions φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p). When pM > P (K1), φ◦2(p) and
φ◦3(p) are not fully determined over the range (P (K1), pM ); in this case we
restrict ourselves to functions φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p) which are non-decreasing and
such that 0 6 φ◦i (p) 6 1 (i = 2, 3).
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 1, 2*, and 3 hold.8
(i) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B ∪ E and p ∈ [pm,min{P (K1 +K2), pM}], then
there is a unique solution for (φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)); φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), and φ◦3(p)
are increasing and φ◦1(p)K1 = φ◦2(p)K2 = φ◦3(p)K3; if pM 6 P (K1 + K2),
then φ◦2(pM )φ◦3(pM ) = 1.
(ii) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B and p ∈ [P (K1 +K2),min{P (K1 +K3), pM}],
then there is a unique solution for (φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)); φ◦1(p) and φ◦2(p) are
increasing and φ◦3(p) is concave; φ◦1(p)K1 = φ◦2(p)K2; 0 6 φ◦2(p) 6 1; if
P (K1 +K3) < pM , then
K2−K3
K2
< φ◦2(P (K1 +K3)) < 1 and 0 < φ◦3(P (K1 +
K3)) < 1; if P (K1 + K3) > pM , then φ
◦
2(pM ) < 1 and φ
◦
3(pM ) > 1; if
P (K1 + K3) = pM , then φ
◦
2(pM ) = φ
◦
3(pM ) = 1 and φ
◦′
3 (pM ) < 0; φ
◦
3(p) is
increasing in the whole range if and only if K1K2 > κ2, where
κ =
[−2D′(p)p2
pm
√
p− pm
p
]
p=min{P (K1+K3),pM}
. (15)
8Note that Assumption 2* is required only in the proof of part (ii) and could be
substituted by Assumption 2 in the proof of all the other parts.
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(iii) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B∪E and p ∈ [max{pm, P (K1+K3)},min{P (K1), pM}],
then there is a unique solution for (φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)); φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), and
φ◦3(p) are increasing and 0 6 φ◦3(p) 6 φ◦2(p) 6 1; if pM 6 P (K1), then
φ◦2(pM ) = φ◦3(pM ) = 1; if pM > P (K1), then φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p) are not de-
fined for p = P (K1) and φ
◦
i (P (K1)−) = 1 − pmK1−P (K1)(K1−K2−K3)2P (K1)Ki < 1
(i=2,3).
(iv) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ A ∪ B ∪D ∪ E and p ∈ [max{pm, P (K1)}, pM ],
then φ◦1(p) =
p−pm
p whereas φ
◦
2(p) ∈ [0, 1] and φ◦3(p) ∈ [0, 1] are any pair of
functions such that
pK2φ
◦
2(p) + pK3φ
◦
3(p) = pD(p)−Π∗1 (16)
pD(p)−Π∗1
pKi
− Kj
Ki
6 φ◦i (p) 6
pD(p)−Π∗1
pKi
, 1 (17)
where i, j = 2, 3 and i 6= j.
Proof (i) System (14) reads
pmK1 = p[ϕ2ϕ3(D(p)−K2 −K3) + (1− ϕ2ϕ3)K1]
pmK2 = p[ϕ1ϕ3(D(p)−K1 −K3) + (1− ϕ1ϕ3)K2]
pmK3 = p[ϕ1ϕ2(D(p)−K1 −K2) + (1− ϕ1ϕ2)K3],
and the unique solution such that 0 6 φ◦1(p) 6 1 is
φ◦1(p) =
√
K2
K1
(p− pm)K3
p(K −D(p)) , φ
◦
2(p) =
K1
K2
φ◦1(p), φ
◦
3(p) =
K1
K3
φ◦1(p).
Clearly φ◦′1 (p), φ◦′2 (p), and φ◦′3 (p) have the same sign. If both φ◦′2 (p) and
φ◦′3 (p) are nonpositive, then a contradiction is obtained since
∂Z1
∂p +
∂Z1
∂ϕ2
φ◦′2 (p)+
∂Z1
∂ϕ3
φ◦′3 (p) > 0. This inequality holds since φ◦2(p)φ◦3(p) =
(p−pm)K1
p(K−D(p)) 6 1
(which is equivalent to p(D(p) − K2 − K3) 6 pmK1). The last claim is a
consequence of the fact that pM [K −D(pM )] = (pM − pm)K1.
(ii) System (14) reads
pmK1 = p [ϕ2ϕ3(D(p)−K2 −K3) + ϕ2 (1− ϕ3) (D(p)−K2) + (1− ϕ2)K1] ,
pmK2 = p[ϕ1ϕ3(D(p)−K1 −K3) + ϕ1 (1− ϕ3) (D(p)−K1) + (1− ϕ1)K2],
pmK3 = p[ϕ1 (1− ϕ2) + (1− ϕ1)]K3,
and the unique solution such that 0 6 φ◦1(p) 6 1 is
φ◦1(p) =
K2
K1
φ◦2(p), φ
◦
2(p) =
√
K1
K2
p− pm
p
, φ◦3(p) =
D(p)−K1 −K2
K3
+
K2
K3
φ◦2(p).
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Functions φ◦1(p) and φ◦2(p) are immediately recognized as increasing and
concave; φ◦3(p) is the sum of two concave functions. Clearly φ◦2(p) 6 1
since (K1 − K2)p 6 (D(p) − K2 − K3)p 6 pmK1. Both weak inequal-
ities are satisfied as equalities if and only if p = P (K1 + K3) = pM ;
hence φ◦2(min{pM , P (K1 + K3)}) < 1 if and only if P (K1 + K3) 6= pM .
If P (K1 + K3) < pM , then 0 < φ
◦
3(P (K1 + K3)) < 1 if and only if
K2−K3
K2
< φ◦2(P (K1 +K3)) < 1. Hence we just need to prove that φ◦2(P (K1 +
K3) > K1K2
P (K1+K3)−pm
P (K1+K3)
> K1K2
P (K1+K3)−P (K1+K2)
P (K1+K3)
= K1K2
[
1− P (K1+K2)P (K1+K3)
]
>
K1
K2
[
1− K1−K2K1−K3
]
= K1K1−K3
K2−K3
K2
> K2−K3K2 . The first inequality holds since
φ◦2(P (K1 +K3) 6 1; the second inequality holds since pm < P (K1 +K2); the
third inequality holds since p [D(p)−K2 −K3] is increasing in the interval
[P (K1 + K2), P (K1 + K3)]. If pM < P (K1 + K3), φ
◦
2(pM ) =
√
K−D(pM )
K2
>
K−D(pM )
K2
and, therefore, φ◦3(pM ) > 1. Differentiation of φ◦3(p) yields
φ◦′3 (p) =
D′(p)
K3
+
K2
K3
φ◦′2 (p) =
D′(p)
K3
+
1
2
(
K1
K2
p− pm
p
)−1/2 K1
K3
pm
p2
that equals pmK1
K3p2M
[−1 + 12] < 0 if p = P (K1 + K3) = pM . The last claim
follows from strict concavity of φ◦3(p).
(iii) System (14) reads
pmK1 = p [ϕ2ϕ3(D(p)−K2 −K3) + ϕ2 (1− ϕ3) (D(p)−K2)
+ (1− ϕ2)ϕ3(D(p)−K3) + (1− ϕ2) (1− ϕ3)K1]
pmK2 = p [ϕ1 (1− ϕ3) (D(p)−K1) + (1− ϕ1)K2]
pmK3 = p [ϕ1 (1− ϕ2) (D(p)−K1) + (1− ϕ1)K3] ,
and the unique solution such that 0 6 φ◦1(p) 6 1 is
φ◦1(p) =
√{
p (K1 +K2 −D (p))
(p− pm)K2
p (K1 +K3 −D (p))
(p− pm)K3 +
K1
K2K3
p (D (p)−K1)
(p− pm)
}−1
,
φ◦2(p) = 1−
K3
D(p)−K1
[
1− p− pm
pφ◦1(p)
]
φ◦3(p) = 1−
K2
D(p)−K1
[
1− p− pm
pφ◦1(p)
]
It is immediately checked that φ◦′1 (p) > 0 if and only if
12
ddp
{
p (K1 +K2 −D (p))
(p− pm)K2
p (K1 +K3 −D (p))
(p− pm)K3 +
K1
K2K3
p (D (p)−K1)
(p− pm)
}
< 0
that is
z(p) := ξ(p)
(p−pm)2K2
p(K1+K3−D(p))
(p−pm)K3 +
ξ(p)+pm(K2−K3)
(p−pm)2K3
p(K1+K2−D(p))
(p−pm)K2 +
K1
K2K3
−ξ(p)−pmK2
(p−pm)2 < 0
(18)
where ξ(p) = − (p− pm) pD′ (p)− pm (K1 +K2 −D (p)). It is immediately
recognized that ξ(p) is an increasing function for p > pm.
If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B, then ξ(pm) > 0 and therefore ξ(p) > 0 for each
p > P (K1 +K3) > pm. Moreover
z(p) <
ξ(δ)
(p− pm)2K2
δ (K1 +K3 −D (δ))
(δ − pm)K3 +
ξ(δ) + pm(K2 −K3)
(p− pm)2K3
δ (K1 +K2 −D (δ))
(δ − pm)K2 −
K1
K3
pm
(p− pm)2
6 pm
(p− pm)2
A < 0,
where δ = min {P (K1), pM} andA = δ(D(δ)−K2)−pmK1K2
K1+K3−D(δ)
(δ−pm)K3 +
δ(D(δ)−K3)−pmK1
K3
×
K1+K2−D(δ)
(δ−pm)K2 −
K1
K3
. The first inequality holds since functions ξ(p), p(K1+K3−D(p))(p−pm)K3 ,
and p(K1+K2−D(p))(p−pm)K2 are positive and increasing. The second inequality holds
since −δ2D′ (δ) ≤ pmK1 and therefore δξ(δ) 6 pm [δ(D(δ)−K2)− pmK1].
The thierd inequality holds since if δ = P (K1), then
A =
P (K1) [K1 −K2 −K3]− pmK1 − P (K1) (K2 +K3)
(P (K1)− pm)K2 < 0
whereas if δ = pM , then A =
pM [K1−D(pM )−(K2−K3)]
(pM−pm)K2 < 0.
If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ E, then either ξ(pm) > 0 or ξ(pm) < 0. In the former
case pm 6 P (K1 + K2) and the same argument applies. In the latter case
pm > P (K1 + K2) and there exists β ∈ (pm, pM ) such that ξ(β) = 0, since
ξ(pM ) = pmK3 > 0. The same argument applies once again in the range
(possibly empty, if P (K1) < pM ) [β, δ]. In the range [pm,min{β, P (K1)}]
inequality (18) holds since its LHS is a sum of negative functions.
It is immediately recognized that φ◦3(p) 6 φ◦2(p) 6 1 since φ◦1(p) >
p−pm
p . If φ
◦
3(p) > 0, then the same argument used in the proof of part (i)
proves that φ◦′2 (p) and φ◦′3 (p) are positive since they have the same sign.
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If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B, then φ◦3(P (K1 + K3)) > 0 because of part (i) and
therefore φ◦3(p) > 0, φ◦′2 (p) >, and φ◦′3 (p) > 0 in the whole interval. If
(K1,K2,K3) ∈ E, then
φ◦2(p) = φ
◦
3(p) =√
(K1 +K2 −D(p))2p2 + (p− pm)K1p(D(p)−K1)− (K1 +K2 −D(p))p
(D(p)−K1)p
which is clearly positive in the interior of the interval and nought for p = pm.
It is easily calculated that φ◦1(p) =
p−pm
p if and only if [D(p)−K1]
[(D(p)−K2 −K3)p− pmK1] = 0. Hence if pM > P (K1), then φ◦2(p) and
φ◦3(p) are not defined for p = P (K1) whereas if pM 6 P (K1), then φ◦2(pM ) =
φ◦3(pM ) = 1. L’Hoˆpital’s Rule is enough to prove the last claim.
(iv) System (14) reads
Π∗1 = p [D(p)− ϕ2K2 − ϕ3K3]
pmK2 = p (1− ϕ1)K2
pmK3 = p (1− ϕ1)K3,
Hence φ◦1(p) =
p−pm
p and equation (16) is the unique equality constraint
upon φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p). Inequality constraints are obvious.
A few remarks on Proposition 5 are appropriate. In all analyzed cases
function φ◦1(p) is uniquely determined, continuous, increasing, lower than 1,
and such that φ◦1(pm) = 0. If pM 6 P (K1), functions φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p) are
uniquely determined and continuous; however, φ◦2(p) is always increasing
whereas, in a well-defined subset of the region of the capacity space under
concern, φ◦3(p) is decreasing on a left neighbourhood of P (K1 +K3). If pm <
P (K1) < pM , then a continuous set of pairs of functions φ
◦
2(p) and φ
◦
3(p)
exists and only in a part (of measure 0) of this set functions φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p)
are continuous in P (K1). In fact φ
◦
i (P (K1)−) = 1− pmK1−P (K1)(K1−K2−K3)2P (K1)Ki
(i = 2, 3) (see Proposition 5(iii)) whereas φ◦i (P (K1)) may be any number sat-
isfying constraints (17) with D(p) = K1 (see Proposition 5(iv)). Moreover,
apart for the possible jump downward in P (K1), φ
◦
2(p) is always increasing
whereas, in addition to the possible jump down in P (K1), in a well-defined
subset of the region of the capacity space under concern, φ◦3(p) is decreasing
on a left neighbourhood of P (K1 +K3).
4 Functions Φ2(p), Φ2(p), and Φ3(p)
As mentioned above we first find an equilibrium profile (or a continuum of
equilibrium profiles). In some cases, for instance if (K1,K2,K3) ∈ A∪D, the
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functions (φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)), introduced and studied in previous section,
and the functions introduced and studied in Proposition 4, are sufficient
to achieve the aim; but if (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B ∪ E we may need some other
functions. They will be introduced and studied in this section.
A nice property of all equilibria we will find is that S1 = [pm, pM ]. This
means that φ2(p) and φ3(p) satisfy the equation Z1(p, φ2(p), φ3(p)) = Π
∗
1,
which can also be stated, with obvious meaning of the symbols, either
as φ2(p) = H2(p, φ3(p)) or as φ3(p) = H3(p, φ3(p)).
9 Note that func-
tion Hi(p, ϕj) is continuous, almost everywhere differentiable, such that
Hi(pm, 0) = 0, Hi(pM , 1) = 1,
∂Hi
∂p > 0 whenever 0 < ϕj 6 1 and 0 <
Hi(p, ϕj) 6 1, and ∂Hi∂ϕj < 0 each p (i 6= 1 and j 6= 1, i). Moreover, if φi(p) is
constant in an open interval I ⊂ (p(i)m , p(i)M ), then I is (part of) a gap of Si
and, we will see, this implies that φi(p) < φ
◦
i (p) and φj(p) > φ
◦
j (p) for p ∈ I.
On the contrary if φi(p) is increasing in an interval I, then φi(p) > φ◦i (p)
for p ∈ I with φi(p) = φ◦i (p) and φj(p) = φ◦j (p) if φj(p) is also increasing.
In this section we will introduce the functions Φ1(p), Φ2(p), and Φ3(p),
defined in the range [pm, pM ]. The last two are transformations of functions
φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p); they are defined in a few steps that involve other functions
as follows:10
Φ31(p) = min
p6y6pM
φ◦3(y),
Φ21(p) = H2(p,Φ31(p)),
Φ22(p) = min
p6y6pM
Φ21(y),
Φ32(p) = H3(p,Φ22(p)),
Φ3(p) = min
p6y6pM
max{φ◦3(y),Φ32(y)},
Φ2(p) = H2(p,Φ3(p)).
Obviously if (K1,K2,K3) is such that a continuous set of pairs of functions
φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p) exists, then also a continuous set of pairs of functions Φ2(p)
9It is easily calculated that if p ∈ [pm,min{P (K1 + K2), pM}], then H2(p, ϕ3) :=
(p−pm)K1
p[K−D(p)]ϕ3 ; if p ∈ [P (K1 + K2),min{P (K1 + K3), pM}], then H2(p, ϕ3) :=
(p−pm)K1
p[K1+K2−D(p)+K3ϕ3] ; if p ∈ [max{pm, P (K1 +K3)},min{P (K1), pM}], then H2(p, ϕ3) :=
(p−pm)K1−p[K1+K3−D(p)]ϕ3
p[K1+K2−D(p)]+p[D(p)−K1]ϕ3] ; if p ∈ [max{pm, P (K1)}, pM ], then H2(p, ϕ3) :=
pD(p)−Π∗1−pK3ϕ3
pK2
. Similarly for H3(p, ϕ2)
10One might equivalently obtain Φ2(p) and Φ3(p) by analogous transformations starting
from function φ◦2(p).
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and Φ3(p) exists. Note that if φ
◦
i (P (K1)) < φ
◦
i (P (K1)−), then Φi(p) is con-
stant in a left neighbourhood of P (K1). Note also that if φ
◦
2(p) and φ
◦
3(p) are
both increasing in the range [pm, pM ], then φ
◦
3(p) = Φ31(p) = Φ32(p) = Φ3(p)
and φ◦2(p) = Φ21(p) = Φ22(p) = Φ2(p) throughout [pm, pM ]. Moreover, if
φ◦2(p) is increasing in the range [pm, pM ], but φ◦3(p) is not so in part of
this range, then Φ31(p) = Φ32(p) = Φ3(p) and Φ21(p) = Φ22(p) = Φ2(p)
throughout [pm, pM ] since, as we will see, Φ21(p) is increasing wherever
Φ31(p) is constant. Similarly, if φ
◦
3(p) is increasing in the range [pm, pM ], but
φ◦2(p) is not so in part of this range (i.e φ◦2(p) jumps down at P (K1)), then
φ◦3(p) = Φ31(p), Φ32(p) = Φ3(p), and Φ21(p) = Φ22(p) = Φ2(p) throughout
[pm, pM ] since, as we will see, Φ32(p) is increasing in the range in which
Φ21(p) is constant. Only when both φ
◦
2(p) and φ
◦
3(p) are not always increas-
ing in the range [pm, pM ] we have that in part of this range Φ32(p) 6= Φ3(p)
and Φ22(p) 6= Φ2(p) (see Example 1 in Section 6).
Finally Φ1(p) is defined as the solution in ϕ1 of the equations
[max{Φ′2(p−),Φ′2(p+)}][pmK2 − Z2(p, ϕ1,Φ3(p))] = 0
[max{Φ′3(p−),Φ′3(p+)}][pmK3 − Z3(p, ϕ1,Φ2(p))] = 0
Note that if max{Φ′2(p−),Φ′2(p+)} and max{Φ′3(p−),Φ′3(p+)} are both pos-
itive, then Φ2(p) = φ
◦
2(p) and Φ3(p) = φ
◦
3(p), the two equations are equiva-
lent, and Φ1(p) = φ
◦
1(p). The following proposition explores the properties of
Φ1(p), Φ2(p), Φ3(p) over a well-specified subset of the region of the capacity
space under concern in this paper.
Proposition 6 Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B ∪ E and K1 + K3 > D(pM ). Then
functions Φ2(p) and Φ3(p) are (i) continuous, (ii) almost everywhere differ-
entiable, and (iii) non decreasing; (iv) Φ2(pm) = Φ3(pm) = 0, (v) Φ2(pM ) =
Φ3(pM ) = 1; (vi) Φi(p) is increasing over any range in which Φj(p) is con-
stant (i, j ∈ {2, 3} and j 6= i); (vii) if Φ′i(p′) = 0, then Φi(p′) 6 φ◦i (p′)
and Φj(p
′) > φ◦j (p′), whereas (viii) if max{Φ′i(p′−),Φ′i(p′+)} > 0, then
Φi(p
′) > φ◦i (p′); (ix) Φ1(p) > φ◦1(p) is everywhere increasing.
Proof Φ31(p) is nondecreasing and never jumps down (by definition);
it is almost everywhere differentiable; Φ31(pm) = 0 and Φ31(pM ) = 1
since K1 + K3 > D(pM ); hence 0 6 Φ31(p) 6 1 for p ∈ [pm, pM ]. Be-
cause of the properties of H2(·, ·) Φ21(p) is larger than φ◦2(p) and increasing
wherever Φ′31(p) = 0 and is equal to φ◦2(p) elsewhere; it never jumps up,
since Φ31(p) never jumps down, and is almost everywhere differentiable;
Φ21(pm) = 0 and Φ21(pM ) = 1. Φ22(p) is nondecreasing and continuous,
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by definition and since Φ21(p) never jumps up; it is almost everywhere
differentiable; Φ22(pm) = 0 and Φ22(pM ) = 1;hence 0 6 Φ21(p) 6 1 for
p ∈ [pm, pM ]. Because of the properties of H3(·, ·) Φ32(p) is larger than
Φ31(p) and increasing wherever Φ22(p) is constant and is equal to Φ31(p)
elsewhere; it is continuous, almost everywhere differentiable, and nonde-
creasing; Φ32(pm) = 0 and Φ32(pM ) = 1; hence 0 6 Φ32(p) 6 1. Thus
the properties (i)-(vi) claimed for Φ2(p) and Φ3(p) hold for functions Φ22(p)
and Φ32(p). Moreover function Φ32(p) satisfies property (vii) claimed for
function Φ3(p) and function Φ22(p) satisfies property (viii) claimed for func-
tion Φ2(p). Indeed function Φ31(p) satisfies property (vii) and Φ
′
32(p
′) = 0
only if Φ32(p
′) = Φ31(p′) and Φ′31(p′) = 0; Φ21(p) > φ◦2(p) each p and
Φ22(p) = Φ21(p) wherever max{Φ′22(p′−),Φ′22(p′+)} > 0. It is immediately
checked that Φ2(p) and Φ3(p) satisfy properties (i)-(vi). Next we prove
that function Φ3(p) satisfies both properties (vii)-(viii). This is certainly
so in any interval in which Φ3(p) = Φ32(p): property (vii) was proved
to hold in these intervals and property (viii) is a consequence of the fact
that φ◦3(p) 6 Φ32(p) in any of these intervals. In any interval in which
Φ3(p) 6= Φ32(p), and hence, Φ3(p) > Φ32(p), φ◦3(p) > Φ32(p) and there-
fore if max{Φ′3(p′−),Φ′3(p′+)} > 0, then Φ3(p) = φ◦3(p) and if Φ′3(p) = 0,
Φ3(p) < φ
◦
3(p). Similarly for function Φ2(p). In any interval in which
Φ3(p) = Φ32(p), and therefore Φ2(p) = Φ22(p), property (viii) was proved
to hold and property (vii) is a consequence of the fact that φ◦3(p) 6 Φ32(p),
and therefore φ◦2(p) > Φ22(p). In any interval in which Φ3(p) > Φ32(p), and
therefore Φ2(p) < Φ22(p), if max{Φ′3(p′−),Φ′3(p′+)} > 0, then Φ3(p) = φ◦3(p)
and therefore Φ2(p) = φ
◦
2(p) whereas if Φ
′
3(p) = 0, Φ2(p) > φ
◦
2(p). Claim
(ix) is easily obtained from Proposition 5 and the following facts.
• If p ∈ [pm, P (K1 + K2)], then Φ1(p) = KiK1 Φi(p) whenever Φj(p) is
constant ({i, j} = N−1);
• if p ∈ [P (K1 + K2), P (K1 + K3)], then Φ1(p) = K2K1 Φ2(p) whenever
Φ3(p) is constant and Φ1(p) =
p−pm
pΦ2(p)
whenever Φ2(p) is constant.
• If p ∈ [max{pm, P (K1 + K3)}, P (K1)] and P (K1) < pM ,11 it is easily
calculated that in this range dΦidp =
K1
Ki
dΦ1
dp +D
′(p)Φj(p)
Ki−Kj(1−Φj(p))
[K1+Ki−D(p)+Φj(p)(D(p)−K1)]2 ,
whenever Φj(p) is constant (i, j = 2, 3 and i 6= j). Since Φi(p) is
increasing in this range, then the required property holds if Ki −
Kj (1− Φj(p)) > 0. This inequality obviously holds when (K1,K2,K3) ∈
11From Proposition 5(iii) we know that if pM 6 P (K1), then φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p) are both
increasing in this range and so are also Φ2(p) and Φ3(p).
17
E and when (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B and i = 2. Then we analyze the case
in which (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B and i = 3. Since Φ2(p) > min{φ◦2(P (K1 +
K3)), φ
◦
2(P (K1))} it is enough to prove that φ◦2(P (K1)) > K2−K3K2 , that
is (P (K1)−pm)K1 > P (K1)K2 since φ◦2(P (K1)) > (P (K1)−pm)K1−P (K1)K3P (K1)K2
because of Proposition 5(iv). Indeed pmK1K1−K2 6
P (K1+K2)K1
K1−K2 <
K1
K1−K2
K1−K2−K3
K1−K3 P (K1) <
P (K1). The first inequality holds since pm 6 P (K1 + K2) in set
B; the second inequality is a consequence of the fact that pM >
P (K1) and therefore function p[D(p) − K2 − K3] is increasing over
[P (K1 +K2), P (K1)].
From the properties highlighted by Proposition 6, it should already be
apparent that for (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B ∪ E and K1 + K3 > D(pM ) any triple
(Φ1(p),Φ2(p),Φ3(p)) is actually an equilibrium of the price game.
5 Profiles of equilibrium strategies when Π∗3 = pmK3
We can now characterize equilibria when Π∗3 = pmK3. In order to accomplish
this task we introduce the following partitions of sets B and E.
B1 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ B : D(pM ) > K1 +K2}
B2 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ B : K1 +K2 > D(pM ) > K1 +K3}
B3 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ B : K1 +K3 > D(pM ) > K1,K1K2 > κ2}
B4 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ B : K1 +K3 > D(pM ) > K1,K1K2 < κ2}
B5 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ B : K1 > D(pM ),K1K2 > κ2}
B6 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ B : K1 > D(pM ),K1K2 < κ2}
E1 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ E : D(pM ) > K1}
E2 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ E : D(pM ) < K1 < D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
}
E3 = {(K1,K2,K3) ∈ E : D(pM ) < D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
6 K1 < D(p̂)}
where κ is defined by equation (15).
We will see that a unique equilibrium exists for capacity configurations
in the set B1∪B2∪B3∪B4∪E1. In the set B1∪B2∪B3∪E1, the supports
of equilibrium strategies are connected whereas in the set B4 φ
′
3(p) = 0
throughout a well-defined range (p˜, P (K1 +K3)). A continuum of equilibria
exists for any capacity configuration in the set B5 ∪B6 ∪E2 ∪E3. Actually,
the degree of freedom in the determination of φ2(p) and φ3(p) for p > P (K1)
in set B5 ∪B6 ∪E2 ∪E3 allows for equilibria in which either φ2(p) or φ3(p)
is constant on a left neighbourhood of P (K1). In the set B6, equilibria with
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such a gap also entail the gap referred above in connection with set B4 (see
Example 1 in next section).
Theorem 2 Let Assumptions 1, 2*, and 3 hold.12
(i) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ A. Let φ◦◦3 (p) be any non-decreasing function
such that φ◦◦2 (p) =
pD(p)−Π∗1−pK3φ◦◦3 (p)
pK2
is non-decreasing,13 φ◦◦3 (pm) = 0,
φ◦◦3 (pM ) = 1. Then (φ◦1(p), φ◦◦2 (p), φ◦◦3 (p)) is an equilibrium strategy profile;
in such equilibrium S1 = [pm, pM ] = S2 ∪ S3 and Pr(pi = p) = 0 for p < pM
(each i).
(ii) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B1 ∪ B2. There is an equilibrium in which S1 =
S2 = [pm, pM ], S3 = [pm, p
(3)
M ] and p
(3)
M < pM : hence (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) =
(φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)) throughout S3 and (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) = (φ??12(p), φ??2 (p), 1)
throughout S1 − S3.
(iii) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B3 ∪E1. There is an equilibrium in which S1 =
S2 = S3 = [pm, pM ]: hence (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) = (φ
◦
1(p), φ
◦
2(p), φ
◦
3(p)) =
(Φ1(p),Φ2(p),Φ3(p)) throughout [pm, pM ]. In E1, φ2(p) = φ3(p).
(iv) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B4. There is an equilibrium in which (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) =
(Φ1(p),Φ2(p),Φ3(p)). Note that S1 = S2 = [pm, pM ], S3 = [pm, p˜]∪ [P (K1 +
K3), pM ], and (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) = (φ
◦
1(p), φ
◦
2(p), φ
◦
3(p)) throughout S3.
(v) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B5 ∪ B6 ∪ E2 ∪ E3. Let φ◦◦3 (p) be any non-
decreasing function defined in the interval [P (K1), pM ] such that φ
◦◦
2 (p) =
pD(p)−Π∗1−pK3φ◦◦3 (p)
pK2
is non-decreasing, 0 6 φ◦◦3 (P (K1)) 6
P (K1)−pm
P (K1)
K1
K3
, and
φ◦◦3 (pM ) = 1. There is an equilibrium in which (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) =
(Φ1(p),Φ2(p),Φ3(p)), where Φ2(p) and Φ3(p) are built using φ
◦◦
2 (p) and
φ◦◦3 (p) as φ◦2(p) and φ◦3(p) in the range [P (K1), pM ]. Note that S1 = [pm, pM ] =
S2 ∪ S3 and (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) = (φ◦1(p), φ◦◦2 (p), φ◦◦3 (p)) in [P (K1), pM ].14
(vi) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ D. (vi.a) Let φ◦◦3 (p) be any non-decreasing func-
tion defined in interval [P (K1), pM ] such that φ
◦◦
2 (p) =
pD(p)−Π∗1−pK3φ◦◦3 (p)
pK2
is non-decreasing, φ◦◦3 (P (K1)) = φ?3(P (K1)), and φ◦◦3 (pM ) = 1. Further
let φ◦◦1 (p) = φ?13(p), φ◦◦2 (p) = 0, and φ◦◦3 (p) = φ?3(p) over [pm, P (K1)] and
φ◦◦1 (p) = φ◦1(p) =
p−pm
p over [P (K1), pM ]. Then (φ
◦◦
1 (p), φ
◦◦
2 (p), φ
◦◦
3 (p)) is
12Note that Assumption 2* is required only when Proposition 5(ii) is involved and could
be substituted by Assumption 2 otherwise.
13This condition is equivalent to 0 6 φ◦◦′3 (p) 6 Π
∗
1+D
′(p)p2
K3p2
wherever φ◦◦3 (p) is differen-
tiable
14Note that in B5 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 if φ◦◦i (P (K1)) < φ◦i (P (K1)−) (some i /∈ 1), there is
p˜ ∈ [pm, P (K1)] such that [pm, P (K1)] ∩ Si = [pm, p˜] and [pm, P (K1)] ⊆ Sj ∩ S1. Clearly,
in E2∪E3, φ2(p) = φ3(p) over [pm, p˜]. Obviously p˜ = pm if φ◦◦i (P (K1)) = 0 (see Example 2
in next section). Note also that in B6 there are further varieties of equilibria (see Example
1 in next section).
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an equilibrium strategy profile: S1 = [pm, pM ] = S2 ∪ S3, [pm, P (K1)] ⊆ S3,
[pm, P (K1)) ∩ S2 = ∅. (vi.b) In the special case in which D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
=
K1 function φ
◦◦
3 (p) is uniquely determined, S3 = [pm, P (K1)] and S2 =
[P (K1), pM ].
Proof
(i) It is immediately calculated that φ◦◦2 (pm) = 0 and φ◦◦2 (pM ) = 1.
Hence (φ◦1(p), φ◦◦2 (p), φ◦◦3 (p)) is a strategy profile and it is an equilibrium
strategy profile since it satisfies system (14) because of Proposition 5(iv).
If φ◦◦3 (p) jumps upward, then φ◦◦2 (p) jumps downward and, therefore, is not
non-decreasing. Hence functions φ◦◦2 (p) and φ◦◦3 (p) are continuous through-
out [pm, pM ].
(ii) Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B1. Because of Proposition 5(i) φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p),
φ◦3(p) are increasing all over [pm, pM ] and there is a single p′ < pM such that
φ◦3(p′) = 1; note that φ◦1(p′) =
K3
K1
< 1, φ◦2(p′) =
K3
K2
< 1. Hence there is an
equilibrium in which p
(3)
M = p
′ and φ1(p) = φ??12(p) and φ2(p) = φ??2 (p) in the
interval
[
p
(3)
M , pM
]
.
Let (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B2. Because of Proposition 5(i) φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), φ◦3(p)
are increasing all over [pm, P (K1+K2)]. If φ
◦
3(P (K1+K2)) =
K1
K3
√
K2
K1
P (K1+K2)−pm
P (K1+K2)
>
1,15 then there exists a single p′ ∈ (pm, P (K1 + K)) such that φ◦3(p′) = 1.
If φ◦3(P (K1 + K2)) 6 1, then because of Proposition 5(ii) there exists a
single p′ ∈ [P (K1 + K3), pM ) such that φ◦3(p′) = 1 and φ◦′3 (p′) > 0. Note
that φ◦1(p′) =
K−D(p′)
K1
< K2K1 and φ
◦
2(p
′) = K−D(p
′)
K2
< K2K2 . Thus, in either
case, there exists an equilibrium in which S3 = [pm, p
(3)
M ] with p
(3)
M = p
′, and
in which S1 = S2 = [pm, pM ], with (φ1(p), φ2(p)) = (φ
??
12(p), φ
??
2 (p)) in the
interval
[
p
(3)
M , pM
]
.
(iii) From Proposition 5(i)-(iii).
(iv)-(v) We have just to prove that wherever Φ−j(p′) > φ◦−j(p
′) it does
not pay for firm j to charge price p′. Indeed Zj(p′,Φ−j(p′)) < Zj(p′, φ◦−j(p
′)) =
Π∗j because of Lemma 1(v).
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(vi.a) Clearly (φ◦◦1 (p), φ◦◦2 (p), φ◦◦3 (p)) is a strategy profile either by con-
15Note that φ◦1(P (K1 + K2)) =
√
K2
K1
P (K1+K2)−pm
P (K1+K2)
< φ◦2(P (K1 + K2)) =√
K1
K2
P (K1+K2)−pm
P (K1+K2)
< 1. To prove the last inequality it is enough to remark that
(K1 −K2)P (K1 +K2) < (K1 −K3)P (K1 +K2) < pmK1.
16Note that if (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B5∪B6∪E2, then φ◦◦3 (P (K1)) > 0. Indeed φ◦◦2 (P (K1)) 6
φ◦◦2 (pM ) = 1 and therefore φ
◦◦
3 (P (K1))P (K1)K3 > P (K1)(K1 −K2)−Π∗1. Hence we are
done since P (K1) >
Π∗1
K1−K2 . This inequality holds in E2 by definition and was proved
to hold in B5 ∪ B6 in the proof of Proposition 6(ix). Conversely, if (K1,K2,K3) ∈ E3,
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struction (p > P (K1)) or by Proposition 4(i). It is an equilibrium, actually,
since Πi(p) = Zi(p;φ
◦◦
−i(p)) = Π
∗
i at any p ∈ Si (each i) and Π2(p) < Π∗2
over the range (pm, P (K1)) since over this range Π2(p) = pφ
?
13(p)(1 −
φ?3(p))(D(p) − K1) + p(1 − φ?13(p))K2 < (K2/K3)[pφ?13(p)(D(p) − K1) +
p(1 − φ?13(p))K3] = (K2/K3)Z3(p;φ−3(p)) = pmK2. The inequality holds
since K3(1− φ?3(p))−K2 < 0.
(vi.b) Since φ?3(P (K1)) = 1 only the constant function φ
◦◦
3 (p) = 1 meets
the requirements.
Theorem 3 Let Assumptions 1, 2*, and 3 hold. Apart from the contin-
uum of equilibria due to the arbitrary choice of function φ◦◦3 (p) in interval
[P (K1), pM ] in parts (i), (v), and (vi) of Theorem 2, no other equilibrium
exists.
Before proving Theorem 3 we will prove that no atom may exist in the
range [pm, pM ) in the subsets of the capacity space studied in this paper.
Proposition 7 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (6′) hold and
let (φ1, φ2, φ3) be an equilibrium in which φj(p˜) < φj(p˜+) for some j and
some p˜ ∈ (pm, pM ). Then
(i) Π∗j = Πj(p˜) = Zj(p˜;φ−j(p˜));
(ii) there is p◦ > p˜ such that (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3) ∩ (p˜, p◦) = ∅ and p◦ ∈
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3;
(iii) limp→p˜+ ∂Zj(p, φ−j(p˜))/∂p ≤ 0;
(iv) Kj < K1;
(v) p˜ < P (K1);
(vi) p˜ > P (K1 +K3);
(vii) if p
(j)
M 6 P (K1), then p˜ = p
(j)
M ;
(viii) there is no other equilibrium (φ̂1, φ̂2, φ̂3) such that Π̂
∗
j = Π
∗
j , (p
◦, p◦◦) ⊂
Ŝj, with p
◦ < p˜ < p◦◦, and φ̂i(p) = φi(p) (each i) for p ∈ (p◦, p˜);
(ix) Kj < K2;
(x) (K1,K2,K3) ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3.
Proof
(i)-(v) See [10]; Lemma 2.
(vi) Assume first that p˜ < P (K1 +K2), then Π
∗
i = pmKi (each i) because
of Theorem 1(b). Hence pmK1 > p˜[φi(p˜)φj(p˜)(D(p˜)−K)+K1] and pmKj =
p˜[φ1(p˜)φi(p˜)(D(p˜) −K) + Kj ] (i 6= 1, j); the equality being a consequence
of parts (i) and (iv). As a consequence, φ1(p˜)K1 6 φj(p˜)Kj . On the other
hand, taking account of Lemma 1(ii) and part (iii) we obtain φ1(p˜)K1 >
φ◦◦2 (P (K1)) 6 1 and φ◦◦3 (P (K1)) 6 1 since now P (K1) 6 Π
∗
1
K1−K2 by definition.
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φj(p˜)Kj . The contradiction implies that p˜ > P (K1 +K2). Assume now that
P (K1 +K2) 6 p˜ < P (K1 +K3), then the same argument implies that j 6= 2.
But j 6= 3 too since in this range Z3(p, ϕ−3) = p[ϕ1 (1− ϕ2) + (1− ϕ1)]K3.
(vii) It is enough to remark that Π∗j = Zj(p˜, φ−j(p˜)) > Zj(p, φ−j(p˜)) >
Zj(p, φ−j(p)), each p ∈ (p˜, P (K1)]. The equality is established in part (i), the
strict inequality is a consequence of parts (iii) and (vi) and Lemma 1(iii), the
weak inequality is a consequence of Lemma 1(v). The same argument proves
also that if p
(j)
M > P (K1), then there is p
◦ > P (K1) such that (p˜, p◦)∩Sj = ∅
and P (K1) /∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3.
(viii) Otherwise the following contradiction is obtained (see the proof
of part (vii)): Π∗j = Zj(p˜, φ−j(p˜)) = Zj(p˜, φ̂−j(p˜)) > Zj(p, φ̂−j(p˜)) >
Zj(p, φ̂−j(p)) = Π̂∗j for p ∈ (p˜,min{p◦◦, P (K1)}.
(ix) We will find a contradiction when Π∗j = pmKj andKj−(1− φi (p˜))Ki >
0: both conditions hold when Kj = K2. Taking into account parts (v) and
(vi) and arguing as in the proof of part (vi) we obtain that (φ1 (p˜)K1 − φi (p˜)Ki − φj (p˜)Kj)
[(1− φi (p˜)) (D (p˜)−K1)−Kj ] > φi (p˜) [Kj − (1− φi (p˜))Ki] (D (p˜)−K1)
since Zj(p, φ−j(p˜)) = pmKj and pmK1 > Z1(p, φ−1(p˜)). Hence φ1 (p˜)K1 −
φ3 (p˜)K3 − φ2 (p˜)K2 < 0. On the other hand, taking account of Lemma
1(ii) and part (iii) we obtain (1− φi (p˜)) [φ1 (p˜)K1 − φj (p˜)Kj ] > φi (p˜)Kj−
φ1 (p˜)φi (p˜) [Kj − (1− φi (p˜))Ki], and therefore (1− φi) [φ1K1 − φjKj − φiKi] >
φi (1− ϕ1) [Kj − (1− φi)Ki].
(x) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ A ∪B1 ∪B2, then no atom exists because of parts
(v) and (vi). If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ D, then no atom exists because of parts (v)
and (viii) and Theorems 1(d) and 2(vi). If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ E , then no atom
exists because of part (ix). If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B3 ∪ B4, then no atom ex-
ists because of parts (v), (vi), and (vii) since otherwise Zj(p, φ−j(p)) =
p [φ1(p) (1− φi(p)) (D(p)−K1) + (1− φ1(p))Kj ] > KjKip (1− φ1(p))Ki =
Kj
KiZi(p, φ−i(p)) = pmKj in interval [
˜˜p, pM ], where ˜˜p = min{p > p˜, p ∈
S1∪Si}. If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B5∪B6, we can follow the proof of part (ix) since
Π∗3 = pmK3 and K3− (1−φ2(p˜))K2 > 0. The last inequality holds in any of
the equilibria found in Theorem 2 (it is enough to explore the proof of Propo-
sition 6(ix)). In order to prove that such inequality holds in any equilibrium
we first remind that if φ2(p˜) < φ2(p˜+) for some p˜ ∈ [P (K1 + K3), P (K1)),
then P (K1) /∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 (see the proof of part vii). Then we remark
that if K3 − (1 − φ2(p˜))K2 6 0, the following contradiction is obtained:
Z1(P (K1), φ−1(P (K1))) = P (K1)[K1 − φ2(P (K1))K2 − φ3(P (K1))K3 >
P (K1)[K1−K2 +(1−φ3)K3] > P (K1)[K1−K2] > pmK1. The last inequal-
ity holds since (P (K1) − pm)K1 > P (K1)K2 (see the proof of Proposition
6(ix)).
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Proof of Theorem 3
Let (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) be any equilibrium profile characterized by The-
orem 2 and (φ̂1(p), φ̂2(p), φ̂3(p)) be any equilibrium profile not characterized
by Theorem 2. Further, let
ρ = inf{p : (φ1(p), φ2(p), φ3(p)) 6= (φ̂1(p), φ̂2(p), φ̂3(p))}. (19)
we will prove that it cannot be that
1. ρ > P (K1),
2. ρ < P (K1) is internal to S2 ∩ S3,
3. ρ < P (K1) is internal to [pm, pM ]− (S2 ∩ S3),
4. ρ = p˜, where (p˜, ˜˜p) is a gap of S3 and ˜˜p 6 P (K1 +K3).
5. ρ = p˜, where (p˜, ˜˜p) is a gap of Sj and ˜˜p > P (K1).
If ρ > P (K1) and (φ̂1(p), φ̂2(p), φ̂3(p)) is not any of the equilibria charac-
terized by Theorem 2(i)&(v)&(vi), then either φ̂1(p
◦) 6= p◦−pmp◦ or φ̂2(p◦) 6=
p◦D(p◦)−Π∗1−p◦K3φ̂3(p◦)
p◦K2 (some p
◦ ∈ [ρ, pM ]). In the former case there is a
neighbourhood I of p◦ such that I ∩ (S2 ∪ S3) = ∅ and therefore either
Proposition 7(x) or Proposition 3(iv) is violated. In the latter p◦ /∈ S1, then
Πi(p) is increasing (each i 6= 1) in a neighbourhood I of p◦ and once again
I ∩ (S2 ∪ S3) = ∅.
If ρ < P (K1) is internal to S2 ∩ S3, then there is an open interval (ρ, ρ′)
such that (ρ, ρ′) ⊂ Sj and (ρ, ρ′) ∩ Ŝj = ∅ (some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}). Because of
Propositions 3(iv) and 7(x) (ρ, ρ′) ⊂ ∩i 6=jŜi. Let ρ◦ = min{p > ρ′ : p ∈
Ŝj}. Then φ̂j(ρ◦) = φ̂j(ρ) = φ◦j (ρ) < φ◦j (ρ◦) and there is i 6= j such that
φ̂i(ρ
◦) 6 φ◦i (ρ◦) since Zj(ρ◦, φ̂−j(ρ◦)) = Zj(ρ◦, φ◦−j(ρ◦)). As a consequence
of Lemma 1(v) Zh(ρ
◦, φ̂−h(ρ◦)) > Zh(ρ◦, φ◦−h(ρ
◦)) = Π∗h (h 6= j, i): an
obvious contradiction.
If ρ < P (K1) is internal to [pm, pM ]− (S2 ∩ S3), then either Proposition
3(iv) or Proposition 7(x) is contradicted.
If ρ = p˜, where (p˜, ˜˜p) is a gap of S3 and ˜˜p 6 P (K1 +K3), then φ̂3(p) >
φ3(p) in the range (p˜, ˜˜p) and therefore φ̂3(˜˜p) > φ◦3(˜˜p) = φ◦3(p˜). Clearly˜˜p /∈ Ŝ1 ∩ Ŝ2 ∩ Ŝ3, otherwise φ̂3(˜˜p) = φ◦3(˜˜p). But ˜˜p ∈ Ŝ1 ∪ Ŝ2 ∪ Ŝ3 otherwise
Proposition 7(x) is contradicted. Then ˜˜p ∈ Ŝ3 otherwise Zs(˜˜p, φ̂−s(˜˜p)) =
Zs(˜˜p, φ◦−s(˜˜p)) = pmKs (each s ∈ N−3) and, because of Lemma 1(v), φ̂r(˜˜p) <
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φ◦r(˜˜p) (each r 6= s, 3), implying Z3(˜˜p, φ̂−3(˜˜p)) > pmK3, an obvious contra-
diction. As a consequence ˜˜p /∈ Ŝj (some j 6= 3) and φ̂j(˜˜p) < φ◦j (˜˜p). Then,
arguing as for the case in which ρ < P (K1) is internal to S2 ∩S3, we obtain
that Zh(ρ
′′, φ̂−h(ρ′′)) > Π∗h, where ρ
′′ = min{p > P (K1 + K3)) : p ∈ Ŝj},
some h 6= j.
If ρ = p˜, where (p˜, ˜˜p) is a gap of Sj and ˜˜p > P (K1), then φ̂j(p) > φj(p)
in the range (p˜, ˜˜p) and therefore φ̂j(P (K1)) > φj(P (K1)) = φj(p˜). In order
not to be (φ̂1(p), φ̂2(p), φ̂3(p)) any of the equilibria characterized by Theorem
2(v), either φ̂1(P (K1)) 6= P (K1)−pmP (K1) or φ̂2(P (K1)) 6=
P (K1)K1−Π∗1−P (K1)K3φ̂3(P (K1))
P (K1)K2
:
then the argument developed above applies.
Corollary 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2*, and 3 hold and let (K1,K2,K3) ∈
A ∪B ∪D ∪ E. Then S1 = S2 ∪ S3 = [pm, pM ].
6 Examples
We provide two numerical examples in order to illustrate Theorem 2(v). Ex-
ample 1 characterizes the several varieties of equilibria for a point in the ca-
pacity space belonging to subset B6. In one of these varieties Φ3(p) > Φ32(p)
and Φ2(p) < Φ22(p) over a range. Example 2 characterizes equilibria for a
point in the capacity space belonging to subset E3; apart from the symmet-
ric equilibrium there are basically two varieties of equilibria: equilibria in
which L = {1, 2, 3} and there is a gap in Si (some i 6= 1) and equilibria in
which p
(i)
m ≥ P (K1) (some i 6= 1) and there is no gap.
Example 1. Let D(p) = 14 − p, and (K1,K2,K3) = (7.5, 0.2, 0.1).
Then, pM =
137
20 , Π
∗
1 =
18769
400 , pm =
18769
3000 , Π
∗
2 =
18769
15000 , and Π
∗
3 =
18769
30000 . Note
that pm = 6.2563¯ < 6.3 = P (K1 + K2) and P (K1) = 6.5 < pM = 6.85.
According to Proposition 8 φ◦1(p) and φ◦2(p) are uniquely determined and in-
creasing in the range [pm, P (K1)) whereas φ
◦
3(p) is also uniquely determined
in the range [pm, P (K1)), but is increasing for pm 6 p < p◦ ≈ 6.314627855
and P (K1 +K3) < p < P (K1) and is decreasing for p
◦ < p < P (K1 +K3).
Moreover φ◦3(p◦) ≈ 1.030475263 and φ◦3(P (K1 +K3)) =
√
431
128 − 1. Let real
number h ∈ [211260 , 1] and function φ◦◦3 (p) be any non-decreasing function de-
fined in the range [P (K1), pM ] whose derivative is not higher than 2
pmK1−p2
p2K2
,
φ◦◦3 (P (K1)) = h, and φ◦◦3 (pM ) = 1; then the following profile of strategies is
an equilibrium.17
17Note that φ◦◦2 (P (K1)) = 1 for h =
211
260
,
√
431
128
− 1 = φ◦3(P (K1 + K3)), 471520 =
24
• if h ∈
[
211
260 ,
√
431
128 − 1
]
, then φi(p) = φ
◦
i (p) (each i) in the range [pm, p˜]
where p˜ < P (K1 +K3) is such that φ
◦
3(p˜) = h whereas φ3(p) = h and
φ1(p) and φ2(p) are calculated accordingly (they are the solutions to
the equations in ϕj Π
∗
i = Zi(p;ϕj , h) ({i, j} = {1, 2})), in the range
[p˜, P (K1)].
• if h ∈
(√
431
128 − 1, 471520
)
, then φi(p) = φ
◦
i (p) (each i) in the ranges
[pm, p˜] and [P (K1 +K3), ˜˜p] where p˜ < P (K1 +K3) is such that φ◦3(p˜) =
φ◦3(P (K1 +K3)) and ˜˜p > P (K1 +K3) is such that φ◦3(˜˜p) = h; φ3(p) =
φ◦3(P (K1 + K3)) in the range [p˜, P (K1 + K3)] and φ3(p) = h in the
range [˜˜p, P (K1)]; in both these ranges φ1(p) and φ2(p) are calculated
accordingly.
• if h ∈
[
471
520 ,
731
260 −
√
431
128
]
, then φi(p) = φ
◦
i (p) (each i) in the ranges
[pm, p˜] and [P (K1 +K3), ˜˜p] where p˜ < P (K1 +K3) is such that φ◦3(p˜) =
φ◦3(P (K1 + K3)) and ˜˜p > P (K1 + K3) is such that φ◦2(˜˜p) = 731520 − 12h;
φ3(p) = φ
◦
3(P (K1+K3)) in the range [p˜, P (K1+K3)] and φ2(p) =
731
520−
1
2h in the range [
˜˜p, P (K1)]; φ1(p) and φ2(p) (in the range [p˜, P (K1 +
K3)]) and φ1(p) and φ3(p) (in the range [˜˜p, P (K1)]) are calculated
accordingly. (Note that ˜˜p = P (K1) if h = 471520 .)
• if h ∈
(
731
260 −
√
431
128 , 1
]
, then φi(p) = φ
◦
i (p) (each i) in the range [pm, p˜]
where p˜ is such that φ◦3(p˜) = φ◦3(˜˜p) and ˜˜p is such that φ◦2(˜˜p) = 731520− 12h;
φ3(p) = φ
◦
3(p˜) in the range [p˜,
˜˜p] and φ2(p) = 731520 − 12h in the range
[˜˜p, P (K1)]; φ1(p) and φ2(p) (in the range [p˜, ˜˜p]) and φ1(p) and φ3(p)
(in the range [˜˜p, P (K1)]) are calculated accordingly.
• whatever is h, for p ∈ [P (K1), pM ], φ1(p) = p−pmp , φ2(p) =
pD(p)−pmK1−pφ◦◦3 (p)K3
pK2
,
and φ3(p) = φ
◦◦
3 (p).
Note that if h = 211260 , then φ2(P (K1)) = 1 and if h = 1, then φ3(P (K1)) = 1.
In both these cases, and in no other, functions φ2(p) and φ3(p) are uniquely
determined in the range [P (K1)), pM ]. Note also that if h ∈
[
211
260 ,
471
520
]
,
then Φ3(p) = Φ31(p) and Φ2(p) = Φ21(p) throughout [pm, pM ]; if h ∈(
471
520 ,
731
260 −
√
431
128
]
, then Φ2(p) = Φ22(p) < Φ21(p) and Φ3(p) = Φ32(p) >
limp→P (K1)− φ
◦
3(P (K1)), φ
◦◦
2 (P (K1)) = φ
◦
2(P (K1 +K3) for h =
731
260
−
√
431
128
.
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Φ31(p) over the range (˜˜p, P (K1)); finally, if h ∈ [731260 −√431128 , 1], then
Φ3(p) > Φ32(p) and Φ2(p) < Φ22(p) over the range (p
◦, ˜˜p), where p◦ is
such that φ◦3(p◦) = φ◦3(P (K1 +K3)).
Example 2. Let D(p) = 1 − p, and (K1,K2,K3) = (0.8, 0.125, 0.125).
Then, pM =
3
8 , Π
∗
1 =
9
64 , pm =
45
256 , Π
∗
2 = Π
∗
3 =
45
2048 . Note that pM =
0.375 > pmK1K1−K3 = 0.2083¯ > P (K1) = 0.2 > pm = 0.17578125. Because of
Proposition 8 φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), and φ◦3(p) are uniquely determined and increasing
in the range [pm, P (K1)). Let real number h ∈ [0, 3140 ] and function φ◦◦3 (p) be
any non-decreasing function defined in the range [P (K1), pM ] whose deriva-
tive is not higher than pmK1−p
2
p2K2
, φ◦◦3 (P (K1)) = h, and φ◦◦3 (pM ) = 1; then
the following profile of strategies is an equilibrium.18
• if h ∈ [0, 3180], then φi(p) = φ◦i (p) (each i) in the range [pm, p˜] where
p˜ is such that φ◦3(p˜) = h whereas φ3(p) = h and φ1(p) and φ2(p) are
calculated accordingly in the range [p˜, P (K1)]. Note that if h = 0,
then the range (pm, p˜) is empty.
• if h ∈ [3180 , 3140], then φi(p) = φ◦i (p) (each i) in the range [pm, p˜] where
p˜ is such that φ◦2(p˜) =
31
40 − h whereas φ2(p) = 3140 − h and φ1(p) and
φ3(p) are calculated accordingly in the range [p˜, P (K1)]. Note that if
h = 3140 , then p˜ = pm and the range (pm, p˜) is empty.
• whatever is h ∈ [0, 3140] for p ∈ [P (K1), pM ], φ1(p) = p−pmp , φ2(p) =
p(D(p)−p)−pmK1
pK2
− φ◦◦3 (p), and φ3(p) = φ◦◦3 (p).
Note that S3 ⊆ [P (K1), pM ] for h = 0, S2 ⊆ [P (K1), pM ] for h = 3140 ,
whereas the symmetric solution (for the equal-capacity firms) arises for h =
31
80 and φ
◦◦
3 (p) =
pD(p)−pmK1
2pK2
. For any other value of h, there is a gap in Sj
(some j 6= 1) which includes P (K1).
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